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Rana Plaza and its Aftermath
Contested Understandings in the Global Garment
Industry after Rana Plaza
Sarah Ashwin, Naila Kabeer and Elke Schu¨ßler
ABSTRACT
This Introduction synthesizes the key themes of this special cluster of articles
and explores the implications of the three contributions on garment supply
chains after the Rana Plaza disaster. The three articles examine the perspec-
tives of key stakeholders in garment value chains — global buyers, managers
of garment factories in Bangladesh, and workers at these factories — and
analyses their responses to the new governance initiatives that emerged in
the aftermath of Rana Plaza. Placing the contrasting perspectives of these
stakeholders alongside each other starkly reveals how their different posi-
tions within hierarchically organized global value chains form the particular
lens through which they view post-Rana Plaza initiatives. This special cluster
scrutinizes the particular understandings of these stakeholders and reveals
the very different capacity for voice and influence that they bring to bear
in shaping outcomes. It reflects on the contradictory imperatives faced by
actors in the garment industry caught between a logic of competition on the
one hand and global labour standards norms on the other. The Introduction
concludes by examining the prospects for a re-embedding of the market in
global value chains via the activation of civil society.
THE GLOBAL GARMENT INDUSTRY AFTER RANA PLAZA
The Rana Plaza building collapse of April 2013, which killed 1,134
Bangladeshi garment workers and injured many more, was hailed as a Ru-
bicon in the global garment industry. Palpable shock at the scale of the dis-
aster gave rise to the rapid adoption of new regulatory initiatives. Foremost
amongst these were the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh
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(hereafter the Accord), a transnational, legally binding five-year agreement
signed by over 220 global brands and retailers, and two global union federa-
tions, IndustriALL and UNI Global Unions, along with their local affiliates;
and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter the Alliance), a
much smaller initiative involving mainly US brands. Further initiatives were
developed at national and firm levels. The three articles in this special clus-
ter draw on data from an international research project analysing changes in
the governance of garment supply chains since Rana Plaza and their impact
on working conditions in Bangladesh. The cluster brings together the per-
spectives of three crucial sets of stakeholders within garment global value
chains with regard to the governance innovations that have occurred since
Rana Plaza. The first of the three looks at the buyers — global brands and
retailers (hereafter lead firms) and their efforts to improve labour condi-
tions in global supply chains. For this contribution, Chikako Oka, Niklas
Egels-Zande´n and Rachel Alexander draw on interview data with corporate
social responsibility (CSR) and procurement managers from 64 lead firms
in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The second article in this
cluster, by Shahidur Rahman and Kazi Mahmudur Rahman, considers the
managers of Bangladeshi factories supplying global markets and their views
on the Accord and Alliance. Managers at 109 factories were interviewed by
Rahman and Rahman. The third and final article, by Naila Kabeer, Lopita
Huq and Munshi Sulaiman, looks at the workers in the export-oriented firms.
The authors carried out a survey of 1,500 of these workers, supplemented
with seven focus groups with around 50 workers.
Placing the contrasting perspectives of these stakeholders alongside each
other reveals with remarkable clarity how their different positions within hi-
erarchically organized global value chains form the particular lens through
which they view post-Rana Plaza initiatives. It explains their specific under-
standing of the problems which gave rise to these initiatives; it accounts for
their particular interpretations and experiences of the initiatives and it uncov-
ers the very different capacity for voice and influence that they bring to bear in
shaping outcomes. Our analysis therefore helps to illuminate the thorny prob-
lems facing the global garment industry. Any attempt to improve labour stan-
dards in the industry has to start from an appreciation of these complexities.
Contrasting Stakeholder Perceptions
The first article in this cluster, by Oka, Egels-Zande´n and Alexander, identi-
fies three key approaches of buyer engagement — auditing, capacity building
and advocacy — on the basis of lead firm interviews. The logic underlying
these approaches is that the problems of labour and safety standards common
within garment value chains can be traced to poor factory management and
slack government regulation. Auditing and capacity building aim to address
the deficiencies of factory management, while advocacy efforts attempt to
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secure changes to, or greater enforcement of, government policy in relation
to issues such as trade union rights or minimum wages. Both the Accord
and Alliance reflect this logic. They locate the problem of poor safety stan-
dards in the Bangladeshi garment industry within the internal conditions of
the industry and the country. Tellingly, representatives of the Bangladesh
government and local employers were not signatories to either agreement.
When pushed on what their own contributions should be in addressing the
problem — for example, should they assist suppliers in paying for safety im-
provements or raise the prices they offer suppliers —– the general response
of lead firm representatives was that factory safety is the responsibility of
the suppliers, especially given other investments in compliance issues and
in the light of buyers’ own thin profit margins. Accordingly, only 12 per
cent of the lead firm CSR managers interviewed as part of our wider project
reported that their company had paid higher prices for garments to support
factory improvements (Schu¨ßler et al., 2019).
Reflecting this perspective, Oka, Egels-Zande´n and Alexander argue that a
key innovation of the Accord is that it mobilizes the collective power of lead
firms to pressure suppliers into compliance with safety requirements. That
is, it enhances the effectiveness of private regulation and enforcement while
intensifying power imbalances between lead firms and suppliers, leaving
distributional inequalities within the industry intact (see also Scheper, 2017).
At the same time, other scholars stress the way in which the Accord
enhances worker voice within the industry (Anner et al., 2013), even though
this may be seen as a double-edged sword for local trade unions (Zajak,
2017). This is manifested in the union-inclusive governance of the initiative
(Donaghey and Reinecke, 2018) and its local implementation, with factory
safety committee training and support for freedom of association an integral
part of the Accord’s approach. The Accord thus is not merely an effective
auditing initiative backed by collective organization, but also a transnational
industrial relations agreement (TIRA) with potentially multi-level reach and
spillover effects (Ashwin et al., 2020).
The second article in this cluster, by Rahman and Rahman, discusses the
perspective of those faced with implementing the provisions of the Accord
and Alliance. While the managers interviewed concede that improvements in
safety were required following Rana Plaza, and welcome the resultant boost
to the industry’s image, they were less satisfied with the implementation
process. They pointed to inconsistencies in findings reported by inspectors
which they believed resulted from different inspectors applying the same
standards idiosyncratically. They also stressed the high costs entailed in
carrying out the remediation/relocation recommendations of the inspectors,
the imposition of unrealistic timetables to carry these out and the failure of
the buyers to provide financial assistance with remediation. None of the 109
factories in the survey had received such financial assistance.
Above all, they complained about their lack of voice. As a result of
the collective power of the buyers concentrated within the Accord, and the
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exclusion of employer representatives, factory managers perceived that even
when they had legitimate concerns the Accord was ‘too big to fight’ (quoted
in Rahman and Rahman, this issue). Rahman and Rahman perceive this
‘coercive’ approach to compliance, combined with the lack of assistance
with safety improvements and their exclusion from the agreement, as a key
reason for the growth in resistance to the Accord from both government and
industry representatives in Bangladesh.
Rahman and Rahman do not deal directly with how factory managers
explain safety and labour standards violations in the garment industry, but
they note reports by managers that the prices they receive have continued to
fall even after Rana Plaza, as have their profits (a trend also noted by Anner,
2018). As one manager told them, ‘On buyers’ demand, we are investing a
lot in compliance but they are not willing to give good prices for our products
which could give us a minimum profit’. He went on to claim, ‘Now we are
doing business for the sake of our factory and workers only [not for profit],
because if the factory closed there will be huge unemployment’ (Schu¨ßler
et al., 2019: 16). In line with this quotation, the majority of factory managers
in the survey describe themselves as benign paternalists with 70 per cent
claiming that they ‘treated workers like family’ (ibid.: 33).
This self-perception conflicts directly with the views expressed by workers
in the industry. Kabeer et al. (2019) report that only 14 per cent of the
1,500 workers in their survey believed that management treated them like
family, while 50 per cent described relations with management in ‘command
and control’ terms. The final article in this cluster, by Kabeer, Huq and
Sulaiman, argues that while workers have seen important improvements
since Rana Plaza, particularly in relation to workplace safety, other problems
remain intractable, notably mistreatment at work which was reported by 75
per cent of workers. Nor was compliance with labour standards post-Rana
Plaza always experienced positively by workers. For example, Kabeer, Huq
and Sulaiman (this issue) find that many workers perceive enforcement of
working time limits to have increased work intensity, since the reduction in
working hours has not been accompanied by a reduction in daily targets.
While the majority of ready-made garment (RMG) workers singled out
supervisors as the main perpetrators of abusive behaviour on the factory floor,
one of the more insightful among them offered a more systemic explanation,
having watched his line manager being humiliated by his superior: ‘the
abuse starts at the top and gets passed down to each lower level’.1 But even
this worker’s analysis stopped at the factory level. None of the workers
interviewed saw beyond the factory to the contradictory pressures on their
managers generated by buyer practices higher up the global value chain.
Instead they tended to see buyers as their protectors. Yet, as Kabeer, Huq
and Sulaiman note in this special cluster, the recent research on falling prices
1. Focus group discussion, male worker from an Accord and Alliance factory, Gazipur, 14
September 2018.
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and shortening delivery times by lead firms partly helps to explain the rising
levels of abuse in factories as workers are pressured to pursue ever-higher
production targets.
Beyond the Accord: Re-embedding Global Supply Chains?
The contradictory accounts offered by these three sets of actors directly
involved in implementing the Accord and Alliance initiatives are symp-
tomatic of the partial and piecemeal perspectives of many of the stakeholders
in global value chains. For instance, for those involved in anti-sweatshop
campaigns, the culprits are profit-hungry lead firms. The lead firms, on the
other hand, point to greedy and exploitative suppliers in low-income coun-
tries, with their ‘Porsches, Rolexes, and helicopters’ (Oka et al., this issue).2
Lead firms also present themselves as victims — of cut-throat competition
by rivals. This argument has some force. For example, in the UK several
high-profile clothing retailers including Debenhams, House of Fraser and
Karen Millen have fallen into administration (Butler, 2019), while Marks
and Spencer has been closing stores and in September 2019 lost its place in
the FTSE 100 for the first time since the index launched in 1984 (Thomas,
2019). Meanwhile, their suppliers in low-wage economies can, also with
justification, point to the ‘decoupling’ between the purchasing practices of
lead firms who pay lower prices and demand shorter delivery times, and
their CSR standards, which require suppliers to take on the full costs of im-
proving labour standards, increasing minimum wages and making factories
safer (Ashwin et al., 2019).
With both lead firms and suppliers claiming to face a profit squeeze,
tensions regarding who should pay for labour standards are unsurprising.
They are only likely to increase without a change in approach. It is now de
rigueur for companies to champion worker ‘voice’ and ‘empowerment’ in
their supply chains with freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining enshrined in international soft law in the form of the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (OHCHR, 2011). Were such
voice and empowerment to be effective, however, it would eventually lead
to a greater share of value within the production network going to workers.
The history of the garment and athletic footwear industries suggests that
when this happens the reaction of firms is very often to apply a ‘spatial
fix’ to restore profits, moving production to sites where workers are less
‘empowered’ (see, e.g., Merk, 2011). Although, in some cases, the countries
2. A quick survey of key informants in the industry by Naila Kabeer suggested that many
suppliers owned Rolexes, some owned Porsches but they could only identify two people
in Bangladesh who owned private helicopters, one of whom was linked to the industry.
Privately owned helicopters are not common in Bangladesh.
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left behind have been able to move from garments to higher value-added
forms of production, this is far from inevitable.
Garment workers therefore seem to be caught between a rock and a hard
place: living in a capital-forsaken zone is worse than being exploited within a
global supply chain. The dilemma is as old as capitalism. Marx (1867/1990:
381) long ago noted the limits on employer munificence set by competition:
‘Capital . . . takes no account of the health and the length of life of the
worker unless society forces it to do so . . . this does not depend on the will,
either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free competition, the
immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a
coercive force external to him’. In support of this assertion, Marx cited (ibid.)
the 1863 petition of representatives of the Staffordshire potteries in the UK,
including Josiah Wedgewood, for ‘some legislative enactment’ regarding
child labour, since competition did not allow them to limit the working
hours of children despite their desire to do so. The representatives of lead
firms we have interviewed likewise stress the importance of instituting ‘a
level playing field’ to allow them to uphold labour standards (Oka et al.,
this issue; Schu¨ßler et al., 2019). The search for a floor in the ‘race to the
bottom’ highlights the social constraint on free competition emphasized by
Polanyi: to leave ‘the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate
of human beings . . . would result in the demolition of society’ (Polanyi,
1944/2001: 76). This observation inspired Polanyi’s famous argument that
protective counter-movements emerge to re-embed the market within society
whenever the market logic becomes too dominant.
Yet finding an effective means of protecting workers from the impact of
competition is more difficult in the era of global production networks than in
the time of Josiah Wedgewood. Multiple collective action problems pertain
between firms, between suppliers and between nations. Although imperfect,
the Accord did showcase one means of dealing with such problems through
lead firm collective action, binding agreements with unions and sourcing
guarantees for producers. While suppliers may not have received assistance
with the improvements mandated by the Accord, lead firms did abide by the
important stipulation to continue sourcing from Bangladesh while the agree-
ment was in force. Such a sourcing guarantee has also been incorporated
within another TIRA, the Action, Collaboration, Transformation (ACT) liv-
ing wages initiative,3 whereby countries which facilitate industry collective
bargaining to set living wages receive sourcing guarantees in return. ACT
also recognizes that many labour standards violations originate in purchas-
ing practices, and member firms commit to reforming these in connection
with country agreements.
However, beyond ACT, which builds on the experience of the Accord
(Ashwin et al., 2020), there has not been much progress in expanding the
3. See: https://actonlivingwages.com/ (accessed September 2019).
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Accord model, which, as Rahman and Rahman note in this special cluster,
has faced increasing hostility in Bangladesh. The latter point speaks to
the importance of involving and giving voice to all the social partners in
producer countries in any schemes to raise labour standards to promote the
internalization of goals (Kuruvilla et al., forthcoming). The announcement of
the RMG Sustainability Council in Bangladesh in September 2019, a national
initiative uniting industry, brands and trade unions ‘to ensure a sustainable
solution, based on a unified compliance standard’,4 offers a chance for better
involvement of local actors in Bangladesh, albeit one faced with the task
of overcoming the hostility of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and
Exporters Association (BGMEA). Pushing lead firms to collaborate in the
promotion of TIRAs is also difficult — as the shortage of corporate recruits
for ACT demonstrates.
Buyers and producers alike have only agreed to regulate labour standards
when pressurized by civil society, including production and consumption-
based actors (Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015) as well as organizations in
the North and South (e.g. Merk, 2011). The sustainability and effectiveness
of such regulation likewise depends on coalitions and articulation between
different actors. The attempt to extend the Accord illustrates this need. Re-
cruiting nearly 200 brand signatories to the 2018 Transition Accord required
not only pressure from IndustriALL and union allies, but also campaigning
by global advocacy groups such as SumOfUs, which ran an online campaign
shaming companies which were slow to sign.5
Nevertheless, such cooperation among Northern actors was not enough
to secure the Accord’s future, as the protracted political struggle over the
Accord’s continued presence in Bangladesh revealed. The future of the
Accord’s successor, the RMG Sustainability Council, will be determined
by the commitment of the BGMEA, which in turn will depend not only
on global but also, crucially, on local pressure to participate in good faith.
This highlights the importance of Kabeer, Huq and Sulaiman’s point (in this
special cluster) regarding the need for a broad-based approach to raising
labour standards rooted in civil society. Unions have played a role in the
struggle to raise labour standards, but they have done it in collaboration with
training, awareness and legal support from a wider range of civil society
actors. In line with these arguments, cross-country research on global supply
chains shows that local civil society and regulatory institutions dwarf the
influence of lead firm interventions such as auditing on labour standards
(Distelhorst et al., 2015).
4. See: https://bangladeshaccord.org/updates/2019/09/04/joint-statement-bgmea-accord-discu
ssions-on-the-establishment-of-the-rmg-sustainability-council (accessed September 2019).
5. See: https://actions.sumofus.org/a/john-lewis-marks-and-spencer-debenhams-topshop-sain
sbury-s-sign-the-2018-bangladesh-accord-to-ensure-a-tragedy-like-the-rana-plaza-collapse
-never-happens-again (accessed October 2019).
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Articulation between Northern and Southern civil society actors can be
difficult to achieve, in particular because global power inequalities are mir-
rored in civil society. For example, the effectiveness of Global Framework
Agreements negotiated between global unions and multinationals depends
on the ability of local union affiliates to perform their bargaining and watch-
dog functions, which in many cases is severely compromised by factors such
as low union density and local employer and/or state hostility. Moreover, the
partnership achieved at higher levels may be at odds with conflictual rela-
tions lower down the supply chain (Fichter and McCallum, 2015). Relatedly,
the failure of global unions to reach out beyond their own affiliates within
Bangladesh has led sections of local civil society, including progressive left
unions, to see these affiliates as out of touch with workers’ everyday ex-
periences (Ashraf and Prentice, 2019; Hossain and Hossain, forthcoming).
It has been progressive left unions in the country, rather than those with
transnational links, that have led a series of struggles by garment work-
ers since 2006 that have resulted in successive increases in their minimum
wages.
The creation of global supply chains can be seen as a form of dis-
embedding whereby production is divorced from the regulatory regimes
of consumer countries. As shown above, given the geographical scale, re-
embedding is complex. We have argued that this can only be achieved
through cooperation between diverse Northern and Southern unions and
civil society actors placing sustained pressure on brands, employers and
governments. Crucially, such action must guard against reproducing the
power differences it seeks to address.
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